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IV

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment from the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer K. Wilkinson, presiding, in favor of Defendant
Garry Spire dba Hokeiko Broadcasting Company ("Hokeiko") and against Plaintiff Channel
Twenty Television Company, L.L.C. and the Reverend Isaac Max Jaramillo (collectively
"CTTC"). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0),
and pursuant to the Supreme Court's Order of Referral herein, dated March 7, 2000.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The trial court granted Hokeiko's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c),
Utah R. Civ. P., and denied CTTC's cross motion for summary judgment. The issues arising
from that ruling are:
1.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, Defendant Hokeiko

had the right to terminate the Settlement Agreement as of October 8, 1987, despite the fact that
two days earlier, the FCC had issued a Letter Ruling approving the Settlement Agreement?
(Preserved at R.653-658).
2.

Whether the trial court erred by failing to address, and therefore dismissing, as a

matter of law, CTTC's claims against Defendant Hokeiko, based upon alleged breaches of the
Settlement Agreement, while the Settlement Agreement remained in effect. (Preserved at R.644650).
3.

Whether the trial court erred by failing to address, and therefore ruling that, as a

matter of law, CTTC had no right to waive the condition precedent of finality prior to the
effective date of Hokeiko's purported termination of the Agreement? (Preserved at R.650-653).
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4.

Whether the trial court erred by failing to address, and therefore ruling that, as a

matter of law, defendant Hokeiko was not estopped from terminating the Settlement Agreement,
by his prior conduct? (Preserved at R.658-659).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's ruling arose in consideration of cross motions for summary judgment,
pursuant to Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P. where the issue was:
[Whether] the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions of file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Each of the questions presented for review are questions of law. Therefore, the trial court's legal
determinations are given no deference, but are reviewed for correctness. Ong International
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CTTC and Hokeiko were competing applicants before the FCC for a permit to construct a
broadcast station to operate on Channel 20 in the Salt Lake City market. (R. 1). On December 14,
1995, the parties reached a "Settlement Agreement" whereby Hokeiko agreed to withdraw its
application, and take no action to frustrate or impede CTTC's efforts to obtain FCC approval of
its application. In consideration, CTTC agreed to pay Hokeiko the settlement amount of
$65,000. (R.l) (A copy of the Settlement Agreement is attached hereto as Addendum A). The
payment of the settlement amount, however, was expressly conditioned upon, among other
i
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things, CTTC receiving final FCC approval of its broadcast application. In accordance with FCC
procedures, on December 14, 1995, the parties presented jointly an application for approval of
the Settlement Agreement. (R.3).
In August 1997, while the application for approval of the Settlement Agreement remained
pending, Hokeiko through its FCC counsel contacted a staff member of the FCC, and informed
the FCC staff member that Hokeiko was considering withdrawing from the Settlement
Agreement. (R.509). CTCC suspects that there was more to the contact, but by the time the
motion for summary judgment cameon for hearing, Hokeiko had yet to comply with an express
court order requiring that it produce billing records from its FCC counsel. (R.825-838).
On October 8, 1997, Hokeiko served CTTC notice of its intent to terminate the
Settlement Agreement. (R.510). By the notice, Hokeiko expressly acknowledged that under the
terms of the Settlement Agreement the termination would be not be effective until October 18,
1997. (R.517). Concerned of the possibility of the FCC approving the Settlement Agreement in
the interim, Hokeiko immediately filed with the FCC, a notice advising the FCC that (effective in
10 days) it was withdrawing from the Settlement Agreement, and reinstating its application.
(R.511) (A copy of the Withdrawal Notice is attached hereto as Addendum B).
Unbeknownst to Hokeiko, the FCC had acted two days earlier - granting CTTC's
application on October 6, 1997, dismissing Hokeiko's application and approving the Settlement
Agreement. ("Letter Ruling"). (R.524-526). (A copy of the Letter Ruling is attached hereto as
Addendum C). On October 15, 1997, notwithstanding Hokeiko's belated Withdrawal Notice on
October 8, 1997, the FCC served public notice of its Letter Ruling approving CTTC's
application. (R.513). Accordingly, in the absence of any appeal or petition for reconsideration,
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the order approving CTTC's permit would have automatically become a final, nonreviewable
order on November 25, 1997. (R.675). The finality of the approval was the last remaining
condition precedent to CTTC's payment of the $65,000 settlement amount.
By letter dated October 17, 1997, CTTC advised Hokeiko that it would waive the
condition precedent of the finality of the FCC order, and tendered payment of the $65,000
settlement amount. (R.474, 527). (A copy of the "Tender Letter" is attached hereto as
Addendum D"). Hokeiko rejected the tender. (R.3). Consequently, CTTC immediately filed
this action against Hokeiko, and sought a court order enjoining Hokeiko from taking further
action before the FCC to prevent the Letter Ruling from becoming a final order. (R.1-56, 79-80).
The trial court denied CTTC's motion for a restraining order. (R. 195). Hokeiko filed a petition
before the FCC seeking a reconsideration of the Letter Ruling. (R.532-547). (A copy of the
petition is attached hereto as Addendum E). At the time of the trial court's ruling, Hokeiko's
petition for reconsideration was still pending before the FCC.
As a result of Hokeiko's petition for reconsideration, CTTC amended its complaint to
seek alternatively, an order of specific performance enforcing the Settlement Agreement, or a
award of damages arising from the breach by Hokeiko of the Settlement Agreement. (R.145157). CTTC also filed suit against Lawrence Rogow dba Front Range Broadcasting Company
and Utah Television L.L.C. on related issues.
On June 2, 1999, Defendant Hokeiko moved for summary judgment. (R.467-468). The
principal basis for the motion was that by this lawsuit, CTTC was seeking to enforce the
Settlement Agreement, and that pursuant to ^ 13 of the Settlement Agreement, Hokeiko had the
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right to terminate the Settlement Agreement.1 (R.637-662). On June 25, 1999, Plaintiff CTTC
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. (R.634-636). CTTC argued that by its interpretation
of the Settlement Agreement, once the FCC approved the Settlement Agreement on October 6,
1997, Hokeiko had no right to terminate the agreement. CTTC further argued that even if
Hokeiko had the right to terminate the Settlement Agreement, CTTC was entitled to pursue its
claim for damages arising from Hokeiko's willful breach of the Settlement Agreement which
occurred prior to the effective date of termination, October 18, 1997. CTTC further argued that
Hokeiko was estopped from terminating the Settlement Agreement because it had acted to delay
approval by the FCC of the Settlement Agreement.
At the hearing on summary judgment, the trial court adopted an interpretation of f 13 of
the Settlement Agreement that Hokeiko presented at oral arguments but had not briefed. The
trial court concluded that the "most" reasonable interpretation of f 13 required both initial and
final approval within 12 months. (R.l 170). With a cryptic explanation on record, the trial court
also concluded that as a result of its interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, there was no
further need to resolve the collateral issues raised by CTTC. (A copy of the transcript of the trial
court's oral ruling is attached hereto as Addendum F). Hence, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Defendant Hokeiko, and by implication denied CTTC's cross motion for
summary j udgment.
By granting summary judgment for Hokeiko, the trial court denied CTTC the opportunity
to show that but for Hokeiko's earlier efforts to delay FCC consideration of CTTC's application,
1

Hokeiko also argued that CTTC was not the proper plaintiff in this action because it alleged
that the FCC had not formally approved assignment of interest to CTTC from Jaramillo. Rather
than address the issue, the parties agreed that the complaint could be amended to include
Jaramillo as a co-plaintiff. (R.958-959).
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the Settlement Agreement could have been approved back in August 1997, with finality
occurring prior to Hokeiko's decision to terminate the Agreement on October 8, 1997.
Subsequently, on December 20, 1999, the trial court granted Defendant Lawrence
Rogow's motion for summary judgment, thereby disposing of all claims against all parties, with
the entry of Judgment entered on January 3, 2000. (R. 1152). By the appeal, CTTC is disputing
the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Spire, but is not seeking to set aside the
grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Rogow.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
By this action, CTTC sought to enforce a Settlement Agreement between the parties.
Hokeiko's motion for summary judgment was premised on the simple contention that, under its
interpretation of the language of the Settlement Agreement, notwithstanding FCC approval of the
Settlement Agreement on October 6, 1997, it had the right to terminate the Agreement, and thus
CTTC's action must fail. In response, CTTC disputed the interpretation of the Agreement
presented by Hokeiko. Under CTTC's interpretation, upon approval, Hokeiko could not
terminate the Agreement, unless and until the approval failed to became a final order.
Additionally, CTTC noted that even if Hokeiko interpretation were accepted by the court, there
were three independent reasons why summary judgment would be inappropriate.
At the hearing, the trial court adopted an interpretation of If 13 offered by Hokeiko at the
hearing, but not raised in its brief. Moreover, the court found it either helpful or necessary to
rewrite the parties agreement. By rewriting the agreement, the trial court interpreted f 13 of the
Agreement, as providing the parties the right to terminate the Agreement if "final approval" of
the agreement does not occur within 12 months of the execution of the Agreement. The trial
i
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court did not conclude that the interpretation offered by CTTC was unreasonable, but rather that
the interpretation the trial court adopted was the most reasonable. When asked to addressed the
collateral issued raised by CTTC, without a clear explanation, the court stated that its
interpretation of the agreement obviated the need to resolve the other issues.
By accepting Hokeiko's interpreting of the Settlement Agreement, the trial court erred in
two respects. First, the trial court failed to consider whether the interpretation offered by CTTC
was reasonable. It is not the trial court's role on summary judgment to determine which
interpretation is the most reasonable, but rather to ascertain whether the Settlement Agreement
gave rise to only one reasonable interpretation, as a matter of law.
Second, the trial court erred because the interpretation the court accepted was patently
unreasonable in that it contradicted the actual language in the Settlement Agreement and could
lead to absurd results.
As discussed below, the trial court failed to consider the consequences of Hokeiko's prior
breach of the Settlement Agreement. When Hokeiko served notice of the termination of the
Settlement Agreement, Hokeiko acknowledged that the Agreement would remain in effect
through October 18, 1997. Prior to that date, Hokeiko had undertaken substantial activity before
the FCC to undermine the grant of CTTC's construction permit, in clear breach of the Settlement
Agreement. Under common law, the termination of a contract does not excuse a party for
liability arising from prior breaches.
As discussed below, the trial court erred by failing to consider whether CTTC had the
right to waive the remaining condition precedents and tender payment of the settlement amount.
The evidence presented to the trial court conclusively demonstrated that before the Settlement
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Agreement was effectively terminated, CTTC offered to pay the full settlement amount and
waive the remaining condition precedents. Since the condition precedents were imposed for the
benefit of CTTC, under common law, CTTC had the right to waive the condition precedents,
tender payment and enforce the Settlement Agreement.
Finally, by granting Hokeiko summary judgment, the court denied CTTC the opportunity
to present at trial, evidence showing that Hokeiko caused the delay in the FCC's actions, which
delay purportedly served was the basis for Hokeiko invoking its termination rights. Hokeiko
would not be entitled to rely upon the failure of a condition precedent, when Hokeiko's actions
were the reason for the failure of the condition precedent.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT
HOKEIKO HAD THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT ON OCTOBER 8,1997.
The present dispute between the parties arises from the simple fact that for reasons never

disclosed on the record, on October 8, 1997 Hokeiko sought to terminate the Settlement
Agreement entered into between the parties. Two days earlier, however, on October 6, 1997, the
FCC had issued a Letter Ruling approving the Settlement Agreement, granting CTTC's
application for a construction permit, and dismissing Hokeiko's competing application. When
Hokeiko served notice of its intent to terminate on October 8, 1997, presumably it was not aware
that the FCC had already approved the Settlement Agreement.
The threshold question raised by this appeal, is whether, in light of the Letter Ruling,
Hokeiko had the right to terminate the Settlement Agreement on October 8, 1997. The relevant
provision of the Settlement Agreement which defines the rights of the parties to terminate the
i
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Agreement is f 13, is stated in full as follows:
13. If the Commission or its delegate for any reason fails to approve this
Settlement Agreement, to grant the CTTC application, and to dismiss the
competing applications within twelve months after the submission of the Joint
Petition requesting such approval; or, if approved, such actions do not become
Final Orders, then either Party may terminate this Settlement Agreement upon ten
days' written notice to the other, following which Hokeiko shall be entitled to
resume prosecution of its application.
In order to justify its belated termination notice, Hokeiko raised a myriad of arguments
below. Hokeiko argued that the Letter Ruling really issued after October 8, and must have been
backdated by the FCC staff to reflect an October 6 issue date. (R.473). Hokeiko argued that
Letter Ruling was not effective until October 15, 1997, when public notice of the Letter Ruling
issued. (R.478). Hokeiko argued that the entire agreement, including all covenants and
conditions therein was completely illusory. (R.479). Hokeiko argued that because the
Agreement was not approved within 12 months, the parties could terminate the Settlement
Agreement at any time, even after receiving such approval. (R.475) Finally, Hokeiko argued
that f 13 allows the parties to terminate the Settlement Agreement since (because of its action),
as of the hearing date the Letter Ruling had not become a final order. (R.478).
In response, CTTC disputed the contention that the Letter Ruling issued at any time after
October 6, and presented the actual construction permit dated October 6, 1997. (R.674). CTTC
further argued that, as a result of the Letter Ruling neither party could terminate the Settlement
Agreement, unless and until the approval failed to become final order.
In granting Hokeiko summary judgment, the court focused exclusively on the language of
f 13, and adopted an interpretation that was not raised by Hokeiko in its briefing. The court
interpreted Tj 13, as requiring that the Settlement Agreement not only be approved within 12
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months, but such approval must become a final order within the same 12-month time period.
Since finality did not occur within 12 months, the court concluded that the Settlement Agreement
was properly terminated.
This appeal raises two legal issues concerning the trial court's interpretation of Tf 13. The
first question is whether CTTC presented a reasonable interpretation of the Settlement
Agreement. If so, then the trial court should have concluded that Tj 13 was ambiguous and denied
Hokeiko's motion for summary judgment to afford CTTC the opportunity to present evidence at
trial to establish the parties intent. Second, this Court must consider whether the interpretation of
the Settlement Agreement accepted by the trial court could reasonably construed from the
contract. Since the construction adopted by the trial court requires that the trial court either
rewrite, or write-out relevant provisions of the agreement, and would lead to an absurd result,
the construction offered by CTTC was the only reasonable construction presented. The trial
court should have granted CTTC summary judgment holding that, as a matter of law, Hokeiko
had no right to terminate the Settlement Agreement.
A.

CTTC Offered a Reasonable Construction of the Settlement Agreement.
Assuming for the moment that the interpretation of Tf 13 offered by Hokeiko, and

adopted by the trial court, was reasonable, the threshold question this court must address is
whether CTTC also offered a reasonable construction of the Tf 13 of the Settlement Agreement.
If so, then the termination provision would be ambiguous, or uncertain, and summary judgment
was inappropriate. Winegar v Froerer Corp., 813 P 2d 104 (Utah 1991). In Winegar, the Utah
Supreme Court expressly noted that:
We may uphold the trial court's ruling only if we agree that the contract was
unambiguous. As this court observed in Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d
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690, 691 (Utah 1977), we first examine the language of the instrument, according
to it the weight and effect it shows the parties intended. If the meaning is
ambiguous or uncertain, parol evidence of the parties' intentions should be
admitted. A motion for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal
conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists and there is a factual issue as to
what the parties intended.
Id at 108 (citing Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 1293.)
In this case, it is evident that the trial court exceeded the scope of its authority on
summary judgment. The trial court made no effort to determine whether CTTC's interpretation
of the Settlement Agreement was reasonable, but merely found that Hokeiko's interpretation to
be "the most reasonable to be placed upon this." (R. 1170).
In interpreting a contract, the intention of the parties is controlling. John Call En'g, Inc.
v.Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987). CTTC reading o f t 13, is quite simple,
and does not contradict any language or principle underlying the Settlement Agreement. CTTC
contends that it was the parties intent that once the FCC approved the Settlement Agreement on
October 6, 1997, then neither party could terminate the Settlement Agreement unless and until
the FCC approval, for whatever reason, was set aside. CTTC's interpretation of 113 gives
weight and effect to the express clause in the Settlement Agreement: "...; or, if approved, such
actions do not become Final Orders. . . . " (Addendum A, emphasis added). In determining
whether CTTC's interpretation is consistent with the parties' intent, the Court should also
consider the following five points:
1.

The Letter Ruling Approving the Settlement Agreement Materially Alters
the Rights of the Parties.
CTTC's interpretation of f 13 is the only interpretation that gives weight

and effect to the fact that the rights of the parties were significantly and materially altered upon
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issuance of the Letter Ruling. By its interpretation, the trial court treated both the initial grant
and the final approval on equal footing - both were required to be approved in 12 months.
Perhaps the best illustration of the significance of the Letter Ruling can be inferred by the
desperate efforts by Hokeiko counsel to notify the FCC of Hokeiko's intent to withdraw from the
Settlement Agreement, prior to the issuance of the Letter Ruling. In his affidavit, Mr. Gastfreund
describes the considerable pains he took to put the FCC on notice of Hokeiko's intent to
withdraw:
10. In addition to assure that the staff of the Television Branch of the
Video Services Division of the FCC's Mass Media Bureau had a copy of
Hokeiko's Notice of Withdrawal, I caused a copy of that notice to be sent by
facsimile on October 8, 1997, to: (1) Clay C. Pendarvis, Esq., Chief, Television
Branch of the Video Services Division, Mass Media Bureau; (2) Mary M.
Fitzgerald, Esq., Supervisory Attorney, Television Branch, FCC Mass Media
Bureau; (3) Selina Ayers of the staff of the Television Branch of the Video
Services Division of the Mass Media Bureau. I also telephoned Ms. Fitzgerald to
ensure receipt of my transmittal.
(Aff. of Gastfreund, f 10)(R.511).
Accordingly, since the issuance of the Letter Ruling is a material event contemplated by
the parties, it is reasonable to infer that the parties in drafting f 13 would intend to separate and
distinguish the rights of the parties, before and after the issuance of the Letter Ruling - hence,
CTTC's interpretation of the two key words "if approved." gives the proper weight and effect.
2.

The Process of Finality is Generally Perfunctory.
The only possible challenge to the reasonableness of CTTC's interpretation,

is the fact that there was no time limit imposed on when the Letter Ruling must become a final
order. CTTC's interpretation, however, recognizes that once an FCC letter ruling issues, the
process by which the ruling becomes a final nonappealable ruling, is generally, a perfunctory
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matter. As Hokeiko noted earlier in this proceeding, "The [fjailure to file the petition [for
reconsideration] within 30 days ends the right to challenge the action before the F.C.C.
(Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,
p. 8) (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 405(a)). (R.91). By CTTC's calculation, had Hokeiko not filed his
petition for reconsideration, the FCC Letter Ruling granting CTTC's construction permit and
approving the Settlement Agreement would have become a final order on or about November 25,
1997. See47U.S.C. §§ 402, 405; 47 C.F.R., §§ 1.4, 1.106, 1.115, 1.117. ( Wood Aff, ^ 15.)
(R.675). Thus, it is reasonable to infer that, when drafting the Settlement Agreement, the parties
would have concern over the time period in which the initial approval occurs, but would not be
as concerned regarding the timing of finality.
3.

The Settlement Agreement Was Not Self-Terminating.
CTTC's interpretation gives weight and effect to the fact that the

Settlement Agreement was not self-terminating. Under CTTC's interpretation, both parties had
the right to terminate at any time between December 15, 1996 (one year after the Settlement
Agreement was entered) and October 6, 1997, the date the FCC approved the Agreement by
issuance of the Letter Ruling. By the express terms of the Agreement, after 12 months the parties
could choose to either (1) terminate the joint settlement (on 10 days' notice), or (2) exercise
patience and allow the FCC approval process to continue. By contrast, pursuant to the
interpretation adopted by the trial court, there is no consequence to the parties allowing the
approval process to continue without objection. Either party could, despite sitting idle,
retroactively terminate the Settlement Agreement.
In this case, both Hokeiko and CTTC, at least until October 8, 1997, chose to remain
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patient, allowing the motion to approve the Settlement Agreement to remain under consideration
by the FCC. Thus, under CTTC's interpretation, ^ 13 addresses a legitimate concern, delays in
the approval process, by providing the parties the option to terminate the Agreement on 10 days'
notice, but at the same time recognizes that by inaction, the parties can elect to allow the
approval process to continue.
4. .. The Settlement Agreement Expressly Imposes a 10-Day Waiting Period.
CTTC's interpretation is the only interpretation that gives weight and effect
to the fact that the Settlement Agreement imposes a 10-day waiting period following service of
notice of intent to withdraw. Under CTTC's interpretation either party would be afforded the
opportunity within those 10 days to pressure the FCC to act upon the pending motion to approve
the Settlement Agreement, thereby making moot the notice of intent to withdraw. By contrast,
under the interpretation, the 10-day waiting period is not tool, but a trap. If determination can, in
substance, relate back to an inaction by the FCC 10 months ago, what point is served by allowing
the FCC 10 more days to consider the approval of the Settlement Agreement?
5.

Upon Entry of the Letter Ruling, Hokeiko No Longer Had a Competing
Application Before the FCC.
CTTC's interpretation recognizes that the issuance of the Letter Ruling

effectuates a dismissal of Hokeiko's competing application, and therefore is the only
interpretation that gives weight and effect to the provision in Tf 13 which provides that after the
effective date of termination, Hokeiko shall be entitled to resume prosecution of its competing
application. It is reasonable to infer from this language that it was the intent of the parties, that
upon termination Hokeiko would have an application pending before the FCC. That would, of
course, occur either before the Letter Ruling issued, or after the Letter Ruling was set aside.
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The distinction is significant since the termination rights under ^ 13 belong to both
parties. For reasons not disclosed on the record, Hokeiko decided that it would rather appeal the
dismissal of its application, than accept the $65,000 settlement amount offered by CTTC.
However, assuming that Hokeiko had decided that it would rather consummate the Settlement
Agreement, under Hokeiko's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, CTTC would wait until
the Letter Ruling was approved (and even after it became a final order) and then serve notice of
its intent to terminate the Settlement Agreement. In that situation, CTTC would receive the
benefit of the Letter Ruling, and avoid having to pay Hokeiko the settlement amount. Such an
interpretation would leave Hokeiko not only without the settlement amount, but without a
competing application. That unfair result is clearly not what the parties intended and is not
possible under CTTC's interpretation.
B.

The Interpretation Proposed by Hokeiko at the Hearing and Adopted by the Court
is Unreasonable as a Matter of Law.
Further, the trial court erred by not granting CTTC summary judgment based upon

its interpretation of the Settlement Agreement. It is fundamental in contract law that an
agreement is to be construed to give meaning to all of its terms, and that a construction which
renders any contract provision meaningless is to be avoided. See Oregon Bank v. Nautilus Crane
& Equipment Corp., 68 Or. App. 131, 683 P.2d 95 (Or. App. 1984): Public Utility District No. 1
of Lewis County v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 75 P.2d 1195 (Wash. 1985);
Wyoming Game and Fish Comm. v. Mills Co., 701 P.2d 819 (Wyo. 1985).
The trial court, in adopting Hokeiko's proposed interpretation, ruled that the 12-month
time period applied to both the time in which the initial approval must occur, and the date on
which the approval must become final. This interpretation, however, is patently unreasonable.
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The Settlement Agreement provides two alternative conditions allowing for termination,
which are set forth in separate clauses, separated by a semicolon. The twelve month language is
found only within the clause the requires initial FCC approval, and which approval occurred on
October 6, 1997. Significantly, in order for the trial court to adopt Hokeiko's interpretation, it
found it necessary to rewrite the agreement to move the 12 months on both sides of the
semicolon:
I asked counsel for the defendants where does the 12 months apply, to the
approval or to the becoming final orders? He says becoming final orders. Of
course, I reread that and rewrote it and, number two, if approved, such actions do
not become final orders within 12 months after submission, then (B) either party
may terminate this settlement agreement.
(emphasis added) (R.l 170). In short, the trial court appears to have rewritten the agreement
between the parties in order to accommodate Hokeiko's interpretation of the Settlement
Agreement. The trial court clearly exceeded the scope of its authority on summary judgment.
Moreover, it is patently absurd to suggest that the parties to would intend to impose the
same 12-month deadline on both initial and final approval. As noted above, the process by
which the Letter Ruling becomes a final order is perfunctory, but must nonetheless run its course.
While the Letter Ruling was issued on October 6, 1997, had Hokeiko not filed its petition for
reconsideration it would have become a final, nonappealable order on November 25, 1997.
(R.675). If the parties were genuinely concerned that the finality occur withinl2 months, why
then allow for the initial approval to also occur within twelve months? After 10 Vi months,
finality within 12 months becomes impossible. The answer, of course is that the parties had no
such intent. By separating the two conditions with a semicolon, and imposing the 12-month
limitation period within the first clause of the initial grant, the parties clearly did not intend to
impose the same 12-month period on both conditions. The only possible way for the court to
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reach the conclusion that the parties intended that final approval occur within twelve months was
to rewrite the Settlement Agreement.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE
TERMINATION OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT EXCUSED HOKEIKO
FROM ITS PRIOR WILLFUL BREACH.
Even assuming arguendo, that the trial court properly concluded that Hokeiko had the

right to terminate the Settlement Agreement, effective October 18, 1997, it was erroneous for the
trial court to grant summary judgment without giving due consideration of all collateral issues
raised by CTTC. In its response to summary judgment, CTTC noted that there were three
additional issues the court must address before it could rule adverse to CTTC on summary
judgment. The court made no attempt to resolve the additional issues, but erroneously assumed
that as a result of its interpretation of f 13, it had resolved all relevant issues necessary to grant
summary judgment in favor of Hokeiko.
The first issue the trial court neglected to address, was whether CTTC had the right to
pursue a claim against Hokeiko for damages arising out of Hokeiko's wilful breaches of the
Settlement Agreement prior to the effective date of the purported termination of the Agreement.
A.

Termination Did Not Absolve Hokeiko from Liability Arising from Prior
Breaches.
As a general rule, CTTC has a right to pursue a claim against Hokeiko for

damages arising out of or relating to Hokeiko's breach of the agreement, notwithstanding
subsequent termination of the Settlement Agreement. As stated in Corbin on Contracts:
The exercise of reserved power of termination will usually have prospective
operation only; it will discharge both parties from their contractual duty to
perform promises that are still wholly executory, but will not discharge the duty to
make reparation for breaches that have already occurred.
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6 Corbin on Contracts § 1266 (1964 and 1999 Supp.). See also 166 A.L.R. 392 and cases cited
therein.
By way of example, applying the principle, the court refused to excuse defendant from
liability for a breach of contract in the case of Stem and Company, Inc. v. International Harvester
Company, 148 Conn. 527; 172 A.2d 614 (1961). In Stem, plaintiff and defendant had entered
into a distributorship agreement, which was terminable at will by either party upon written
notice. Id. at 616. After defendant breached the agreement, it claimed that it had no liability
because the contract was thereafter terminated by plaintiff Id. However, the Stem court
disagreed, noting as follows:
"When a contract. . . contains a provisional option giving the right or privilege of
cancellation and the agreement is canceled in pursuance of the right [or] privilege
thus given, such cancellation does not extinguish liabilities that have already
accrued under the contract. . . regardless of whether the liability is that of the
party who exercised the option to cancel the agreement or [as in the instant case]
is the liability of the party against whom cancellation is made."
Id. at 530 (quoting 166 A.L.R. 391). As further noted by the Stem court, "[t]he cancellation
does not preclude or diminish any rights to recover damages for injuries proximately resulting
from the admitted antecedent breach." Id. See also Factory Realty Corporation v. CorbinHolmes Shoe Company, 312 Mass. 325; 44 N.E. 2d 671 (1942) (power to terminate contract
does not absolve party for liability arising from prior breach.) Accordingly, until the termination
was effective, all covenants and duties of the agreement remained intact. See Stem, 172 A.2d at
614 (contract remains operative until "effective date of cancellation").
B.

Hokeiko Materially Breached the Settlement Agreement.
Paragraph 4 of the Settlement Agreement provides that so long as this Agreement

is in effect, Hokeiko shall take no action to impede or frustrate the eventual grant of the CTTC

448060vl

"18-

application."). Even assuming that Hokeiko had the right to terminate the Settlement
Agreement, by Hokeiko's own calculation, the Agreement remained in effect through October
18, 1997. There are two occasions on which Hokeiko materially breached the Settlement
Agreement prior to that date, giving rise to claim for relief.
In the first instance, Hokeiko admits that its counsel, in August, 1997, contacted Ms.
Ayers, an FCC staff analyst who processes applications and settlement agreements, and informed
her that Hokeiko was "considering" terminating the Settlement Agreement. (Affidavit of Irving
Gastfreund, dated November 12, 1997, ("Gastfreund Aff." 15.) (R.512). The intent and import
of this statement is quite obvious. Hokeiko had no legitimate reason to inform Ms. Ayers of its
intent to terminate the Settlement Agreement, other than to discourage Ms. Ayers from
completing the processing of CTTC's application. The discussion Mr. Gastfreund had with
Ms. Ayers is analogous to a party to a lawsuit, which has a pending motion to approve a
settlement agreement before the court, advising the court's clerk that it may back out of the
settlement agreement.
For purposes of Hokeiko's summary judgment motion, the trial court should have
inferred, that the result, if not the intent, of Hokeiko's actions was to discourage Ms. Ayers from
preparing and submitting the paperwork needed to secure FCC approval of the Settlement
Agreement. It is also significant to note that, at the time the trial court considered the summary
judgment motion, CTTC had filed a motion contending Hokeiko had deliberately disregarded a
court order compelling the production of the billing statement of Mr. Gastfreund. (R.825-838).
The billing statements could have shed further light on the efforts taken by Mr. Gastfreund on
Hokeiko's behalf to delay the FCC approval process. In short, the trial court should not have
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granted summary judgment, dismissing CTTC's claim against Hokeiko for its August, 1997
breach arising out of its contact with the FCC.
Second, and more significantly, on October 8, 1997, prior to serving notice of
termination, Hokeiko contacted Ms. Ayers at the FCC, and notifying her of its intent to withdraw
from the Settlement Agreement and to reinstate his own application. (Gastfreund Aff, f 6.)
(R.510). After notifying CTTC of the termination, Hokeiko followed up on the phone call by
copying the FCC with the letter of intent to withdraw, and by filing with the FCC, on that same
date, its Withdrawal Notice (R.510-511). By filing the Withdrawal Notice, Hokeiko willfully
breached the Settlement Agreement. In its Withdrawal Notice, Hokeiko stated that: "Hokeiko
hereby withdraws completely from the Commission its participation in the December 14, 1995
Joint Request For Approval of Settlement Agreement and hereby withdraws that pleading in its
entirety." (R.522).
While, Hokeiko will argue that the Withdrawal Notice was an immaterial breach because
it was served two days after the Letter Ruling had issued, Hokeiko takes the opposite position
with the FCC. In its petition for reconsideration, Hokeiko contends the Withdrawal Notice filed
on October 8, was intended to and should have led to the derailment of CTTC's application.
Hokeiko contends that as a result of its Withdrawal Notice, it was erroneous for the FCC to
approve CTTC's permit. Hokeiko argued as follows:
Hence, the filing by Hokeiko with the Commission on October 8, 1997 of
Hokeiko's Notice of Withdrawal occurred a full week prior to the October 15,
1997 effective date of the Letter Ruling. This was clearly more than sufficient
time for the Commission and its staff to be on notice as to the fact that Hokeiko
had taken action to effectuate its withdrawal from the Settlement Agreement.
In light of all the foregoing, it is clear that the Commission's Letter Ruling was
improvidently issued, in that it improperly and improvidently dismissed Hokeiko's
above-captioned application and improvidently and improperly granted CTTC's
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above-captioned application. The Commission clearly should have continued to
maintain the viability of Hokeiko's application and should have continued to
process it. Consequently, the grant by the Commission of CTTC's application, in
light of the pendency of Hokeiko's application, was improper under Ashbacker
Radio Corp. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
(R.537).
Consequently, Hokeiko is estopped from contending before this court that the Withdrawal
Notice constitutes an immaterial breach. Since Hokeiko's actions before the FCC are not a
matter of bona fide factual dispute, this Court must set aside the trial court's granting of summary
judgment in favor of defendant, and direct the entry of an order granting summary judgment in
favor of CTTC on the issue of liability.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER WHETHER CTTC
WAIVED THE CONDITION PRECEDENT OF FINALITY.
While the trial court considered and ruled that Hokeiko had the right to invoke the

termination provision of the Settlement Agreement, it was error for the court to grant Hokeiko
summary judgment without first determining whether CTTC had the right to, and in fact waived
the condition precedent of finality prior to the effective date of termination. Significantly, in its
withdrawal notice filed with the FCC on October 8, 1997, Hokeiko's FCC counsel expressly
noted that the termination would not be effective until October 18, 1997. (R521). One day prior
to the effective date of purported termination, on October 17, 1997, CTTC notified Hokeiko that
it would waive the condition precedent of finality, and tendered full payment of the settlement
amount. (R.592). Since the condition of finality operated for its benefit, CTTC had the right to
waive the condition precedent and seek to enforce the underlying Settlement Agreement.
A.

The Existence of a Condition Precedent May Be Waived.
It is a well settled rule of law that a party for whose benefit a condition is included
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in a contract may waive the condition and accept performance of the contract as is. 81 C.J.S.,
Specific Performance, 57. The facts in this case are analogous to the facts present in DiLeonardo
v. Paoline, 161 N.Y.S. 2d 660 (1956). In DiLeonardo, the plaintiff/purchaser sought specific
performance of a real estate contract which provided for cancellation of the contract in the event
the realty could not be rezoned. The property was not rezoned. The court noted that since the
rezoning contingency was for the buyer's benefit, the buyer was entitled to waive this condition
and seek specific performance and accept the property as is.
Also, in Caras v. Parker, 309 P.2d 104 (Cal.App. 1957), a real estate contract was made
contingent upon the buyer obtaining city approval to subdivide the subject property. The court
held that by waiving the contingency of the approval and tendering performance, the buyer had
the right to seek specific performance of the contract.
Finally, in National Supermarkets, Inc. v. The First National Bank of Springfield, 390
N.E. 2d 602 (111. App. 1979), the plaintiff sought specific performance of a real estate contract,
under which terms the buyer had the right to rescind the option in the event it became necessary
to pursue litigation to receive clear title to the property. The court concluded that the buyer
waived the condition precedent and tendered performance of the agreement prior to the effective
date of the seller's 30 day notice of cancellation, and therefore was entitled to an award of
specific performance. Id. at 608. In so holding, the court recognized the general rule that
specific performance should be granted where the plaintiff has waived the benefit of a condition
precedent which was for his protection. Id. at 607 (citing 81 CJ.S. Specific Performance @ 57,
850,(1977)).
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B.

The Condition of FCC Finality Was Imposed for the Benefit of CTTC.
Here, there can be no argument but that the condition of final FCC approval was

imposed for the benefit of CTTC. By the Settlement Agreement, CTTC agreed to pay to
Hokeiko the sum of $65,000 in consideration for which Hokeiko agreed to withdraw its
competing application, and to take no action to impede the grant of CTTC's application. Under
the terms of the Settlement Agreement, at If 3, CTTC's obligation to make the $65,000 settlement
payment was expressly conditioned upon CTTC receiving final approval of its application from
the FCC. Consistent with the expectation of the sellers in the cases identified as described, upon
entering into the Settlement Agreement, Hokeiko's only remaining expectation was to receive a
timely payment of the settlement amount of $65,000. By imposing the condition precedent of
FCC finality, however, CTTC had assurance that it would not have to pay the $65,000 settlement
payment without receiving final FCC approval. By agreeing to waive the condition of finality on
October 17, 1997, CTTC agreed to pay the full settlement amount, and assumed the risk of
finality, for which it previously bargained to avoid.
C.

CTTC Waived the Condition Precedent of Finality and Tendered Performance of
the Settlement Agreement.
In the trial court below, Hokeiko questioned whether by the Tender Letter, CTTC

manifested its intent to waive the condition precedent and tendered payment of the settlement
amount. In the Tender Letter, Mr. Wood identified the stated premise of the letter: "The point
of this fax is that we are willing to overlook the breaches if Hokeiko will get back on board."
(R.592). It was CTTC's position was that the Settlement Agreement remained in full force and
effect: "The agreement was still in effect on October 8, and is still in effect, as the notice period
is not up yet." (R.592). Moreover, by the time the letter was sent, the FCC had approved
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CTTC's application and served public notice of its approval, the only remaining condition
precedent was for the FCC order to become a "final" order. By the letter, CTTC clearly and
unequivocally agreed to waive the requirement of finality. "...I am willing to stand by our earlier
offer to pay your client the proceeds of the settlement early, without waiting for finality."
(R.592, emphasis added).
Therefore, Hokeiko's contention that the Tender Letter was not intended to serve as a
waiver of the remaining condition precedents to payment has no merit and does not give rise to a
factual dispute. The trial court erred, by failing to grant CTTC summary judgment, and hold that
as a result of the tender of payment, CTTC is entitled to pursue enforcement of the Settlement
Agreement.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER WHETHER
HOKEIKO WAS ESTOPPED FROM TERMINATING THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT.
By granting summary judgment against CTTC, the trial court rejected without discussion

or analysis CTTC's contention that Hokeiko was estopped from terminating the Settlement
Agreement. Below, CTTC argued that even if Hokeiko had the right to terminate the Settlement
Agreement, it was inappropriate for the court to grant summary judgment without affording
CTTC an opportunity to present evidence at trial that Hokeiko by its conduct was estopped from
effectuating such a termination.
The Utah Supreme Court has long since recognized that "no one can avail himself of the
nonperformance of a condition precedent, who has itself occasioned its non-performance."
Cannon v. Stevens School of Bus., Inc., 560 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1977). Likewise, more
recently the court noted that "[p]arties to a contract are obliged to proceed in good faith and to
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cooperate in the performance of the contract in accordance with its expressed intent. One party
cannot by willful act or omission make it impossible or difficult for the other to perform and then
invoke the other's non-performance as a defense." Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140, 144 (Utah
1982).
For purposes of summary judgment, the trial court could infer that the FCC contacted
Hokeiko in August concerning the Settlement Agreement either (1) because it was prepared to
issue a ruling on the pending Settlement Agreement or (2) because Ms. Ayers was responding to
a call from Mr. Gastfreund. The court could also infer that as a result of Hokeiko's statement
that it was considering withdrawing from the Settlement Agreement, that the FCC delayed ruling
for the additional two months, thereby buying Hokeiko additional time to perhaps negotiate a
"better deal" with a third party. By granting summary judgment for Hokeiko, the trial court erred
by denying CTTC the opportunity to prove at trial that but for Hokeiko's earlier efforts to delay
FCC consideration of CTTC s application, the Settlement Agreement could have been approved
back in August, with finality occurring prior to Hokeiko's decision to terminate the Agreement
on October 8, 1997.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, CTTC respectfully requests that the court reverse the ruling of the
trial court setting aside the order granting summary judgment in favor of Hokeiko and against
CTTC, and remand the proceeding to the trial court with instructions to grant CTTC partial
summary judgment declaring that the Settlement Agreement remains in full force and effect, and
that Hokeiko acted in breach of the Settlement Agreement by its actions on October 8, 1997
before the FCC.
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DATED this 22nd day of May, 2000.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

Q72.

By.
Jerome Romero
Attorneys for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22nd day of May, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANTS' BRIEF, to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
R. Stephen Marshall
David L. Arlington
Durham, Evans, Jones & Pinegar
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Q.?e-
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ADDENDUM A

1

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
This Settlement Agreement ("Settlement Agreement") is entered into by and
between Hokeiko Broadcasting Company ("Hokeiko") and Channel Twenty Television
Company ("CTTC"), collectively the "Parties."
WHEREAS the Parties have filed apphcations with the Federal Communications
Commission ("Commission") for a construction permit for a new UHF television station
on Channel 20 at Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Station") which are currently pending;
WHEREAS two other applicants, KM Communications, Inc. ("KM") and Front
Range Broadcasting Company ("FRBC") have similar apphcations pending for Channel
/

20 in Salt Lake City and Channel 24 in Ogden, Utah, respectively;
WHEREAS the apphcations of the Parties are subject to a comparative hearing,
although KM has requested dismissal of the Hokeiko and FRBC apphcations; and,
WHEREAS the Parties believe that the dismissal of all but one of the competing
apphcations would serve the pubhc interest by permitting prompt institution of new
television service to Salt Lake City.
THEREFORE, the Parties, in light of the foregoing facts and their several
covenants and promises contained herein, hereby agree and contract as follows, subject
to the approval of the Commission:
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1.

At the same time that the Joint Petition for Approval of this Settlement

Agreement ("Joint Petition") is filed with the Commission in accordance with Paragraph
4 hereof, Hokeiko shall request the dismissal with prejudice of its application, in
consideration for which CTTC will compensate Hokeiko according to the terms provided
in Attachment A hereto. Such request for dismissal shall be conditioned on approval
of this Settlement Agreement
2.

A "Final Order" for purposes of this Settlement Agreement means an Order

of the Commission (or any of its officials acting pursuant to delegated authority) as to
which the time for filing a petition for reconsideration, application for review or a court
appeal, and the time within which the Commission may review said Order on its own
motion, have expired and no such petition for reconsideration, application for review or
court appeal has been timely filed and the Commission has not reviewed said Order on
its own motion or, in the event of any such petition, application, appeal or action being
filed or taken, such petition, application, appeal or action shall have been disposed of
and the time for seeking further review of the Commission's Order shall have expired
without any request for such further review having been filed.
3.

This Settlement Agreement is conditioned upon, and the obligation of

CTTC to make the payment required pursuant to Paragraph 1 of this Settlement
Agreement shall not arise unless and until, the following conditions are met (hereinafter
"conditions precedent"):
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a. An Order has been issued and has become a Final Order dismissing with
prejudice the Hokeiko application for Channel 20 in Salt Lake City and approving
this Settlement Agreement
b. An Order has been issued and has become a Final Order (or separate
Orders have been issued and have become Final Orders) dismissing with prejudice
the FRBC and KM applications.
c. An Order has been issued and has become a Final Order granting the
application of CTTC.
d. All of the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement have been
met.
4.

On the date of the execution hereof, the Parties will promptly prepare and

file with the Commission's Video Services Division a Joint Petition pursuant to Section
73.3525 of the Commission's Rules, and shall promptly thereafter file for association
therewith such statements and other supporting materials as may be necessary or
appropriate, requesting that the Division approve this Settlement Agreement and take
such further action as is contemplated hereby. The Parties will use their best efforts and
cooperate to the extent necessary to prepare and file whatever documents may be
required to seek and obtain final Commission approval of this Settlement Agreement
Further, so long as this Agreement is in effect, Hokeiko shall take no action to impede
or frustrate the eventual grant of the CTTC application.
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5.

The Parties agree to maintain the confidentiality of the terms of this

Settlement Agreement unless and until such time as a Joint Petition is filed with the
Commission pursuant to Paragraph 4.
6.

In the event of default by one Party in the performance of the obligations

imposed upon the Parties to this Settlement Agreement, the other Party shall be entitled
to pursue any remedies for redress of injuries from such default that are available at law
or in equity or otherwise, including reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs incurred
in enforcing this Settlement Agreement In addition, Hokeiko acknowledges that CTTC
has no adequate remedy at law if Hokeiko shall fail to perfonn any of its obligations
hereunder, and Hokeiko confirms and agrees that CTTC's rights to specific performance
are essential to protect CTTC's rights and interests. Accordingly, Hokeiko hereby agrees
that, in addition to whatever remedy CTTC may elect to pursue, CTTC shall have the
right to such specific performance of this Settlement Agreement, and Hokeiko agrees
to waive the defense that CTTC has an adequate remedy at law and to interpose no
objection, legal or otherwise, to the propriety of specific performance as a remedy.
7.

This Settlement Agreement shall be governed and construed under the laws

of the State of Utah, the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and the
Commission's Rules and Regulations.
8.

Each Party represents to the other that (a) it is not under any restrictions,

contractual or otherwise, which are inconsistent with this Settlement Agreement or which
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would prevent or preclude such Party from entering into this Settlement Agreement or
from performing such Party's obligations hereunder; and (b) this Settlement Agreement
is a legally binding obhgation of such Party and is enforceable against such Party in
accordance with its terms. This Settlement Agreement shall be binding upon and shall
inure to the benefit of the Parties and their respective successors, heirs and assigns.
9.

Any notice with regard to this Settlement Agreement shall be in writing and

shall be deemed given when received via overnight courier service to the following:
For CTTC:
Isaac Max Jaramillo
131 N. 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
with copy to:
Bany D. Wood, Esquire
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
Suite 900
2300 M Street, RW.
Washington, D.C 20037
For Hokeiko:
Gany A Spire
16500 Akron Street
Pacific Palisades, California 90272
with copy to:
Irving Gastfreund, Esquire
Kaye, Scholer et aL
901 15th Street, NW, Suite 1100
Washington, D.C 20036

/
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10.

This Settlement Agreement, including Attachment A, constitutes the entire

understanding of the Parties and supersedes any prior or contemporaneous written or
oral agreements or understandings between them. No modification, amendment or
waiver of any provision of this Settlement Agreement, in whole or in part, will be valid
unless in writing signed by the Parties.
11.

This Settlement Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts,

each of which shall be deemed an original, and all counterparts so executed shall
constitute one agreement, binding on the Parties hereto, notwithstandingthat the Parties
are not signatory to the same counterpart.
12.

• • ' . " .

The execution of this Agreement by each Party shall constitute the executing

individual's declaration under penalty of perjury, affirming for purposes of Section
73.3525(a) of the Commission's Rules, (a) that its respective application with the
Commission was not filed for the purpose of reaching or carrying out this or any other
settlement agreement; (b) that this Settlement Agreement constitutes the entire
agreement between the Parties and sets forth all consideration between the Parties; and
(c) it believes that this Settlement Agreement, after Commission approval, will serve the
pubhc interest because it will expedite the inauguration of a new UHF television service
to Salt Lake City, Utah and will either obviate the need for further proceedings or reduce
the number of comparative applicants, thereby conserving the Commission's resources.

P*£c7of7
13.

If the Commission or itt delegate for any reason fails to approve this

Settlement Agreement, to grant the CTTC application, and to dismiss the competing
applications within twelve months after the submission of the Joint Petition requestin£
such approval; or, if approved, such tu^iou% do not become Final Orders, then either
Party may terminate this Settlement Agreement upon ten day*' written notice to the
other, following which Hokeiko shall be entitled to resume prosecution of its application.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement c&cdivc
as of this 14th Day of December, 1995.

CHANNEL TWENTY TELEVISION
COMPANY

HOKEIKO BROADCASTING
COMPANY

(
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. If the Commission or its delegate for any reason fails to approve this

Settlement Agreement, to grant the CTTC application, and to dismiss the competing
applications within twelve months after the submission of the Joint Petition requesting
such approval; or, if approved, such actions do not become Final Orders, then either
Party may terminate this Settlement Agreement upon ten days' written notice to the
other, fbltowins whichHokciko shall be entitled to resume prosecution of its application.
IN WTINESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement effective
as of this 14th Day of December, 1995.

CHANNEL TWENTY TELEVISION
S

OO£PANY

^^^^oJhxAQmil^]

—"y

HOKEIKO BROADCASTING ,
COMPANY

'

„.

ATTACHMENT A

Payment of the consideration set forth in Paragraph 1 of the foregoing Settlement
Agreement shall be made by wire transfer or by cheek in the amount of Sixty-Five
Thousand Dollars ($65,000). Such fundi ihill be wired to an account designated by, or
iuch check delivered to, Irving Ga^tfrcund, ai attorney for Hokclko Broadcasting
Company, at the address noted in Paragraph 9, or before thefortbusiness day thirty days
following the latest of (a) the date of a Commission Order approving this Settlement
Agreement, (b) the date of a Commission Order dismissing the FRBC application, (c)
the date of a Commission Order dismissing the KM application, or (d) the date of a
Commission Order granting to CTTC a construction permit for^e Station becomes a
Final Orders),

/

Read and Approved:
HOKBKO BROADCASTING COMPANY
^

»~i*V""

Read and Approved;
CHANNEL TWENTY TEUEVISION
COMPANY

Luuic Mix Jaramilio
President

ATTACHMENT A

Payment of the consideration set forth in Paragraph 1 of the foregoing Settlement
Agreement shall be made by wire transfer or by check in the amount of Sixty-Five
Thousand Dollars ($65,000). Such foadxshafl be vared to an account designated by, _or
such check delivered to, Irving Oastfreund, as attorney for Hokeiko Broadcasting
Company, at the address noted in Paragraph 9, or before thefirstbusinew day thirty days
fonowing the latest of (a) the date of a Commission Order approving this Settlement
Agreement, (b) the date of a Commission Order dismissing the ERBC application, (c)
the c*ate of a Commission Order dkniflring the KM application, or (d) the date of a (
Commission Order granting to CITC a construction permit for the Station becomes a
Final Qrder(s).

Read and Approved: HOKEIKO.BROADCASTING COMPANY

Read and Approved:
CHANNEL'TWENTY TELEVISION
COMPANY

>7
Isaac Max Jaraniiflo
President .
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BEFORE THE

$ehetul (KmntttuntratixmH (EammiBBhm
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554

In re Applications of

MM Docket No.

KM COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

File No. BPCT-950109KE

CHANNEL TWENTY TELEVISION COMPANY

File No. BPCT-950320KK

GARRY A. SPIRE d/b/a

HOKEIKO BROADCASTING COMPANY

File No. BPCT-950321KG

For Construction Permit For
A New UHF Television Station
On Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah
FRONT RANGE BROADCASTING COMPANY

File No. BPCT-950321KH

For Construction Permit For
A New UHF Television Station
On Channel 24 in Ogden, Utah
TO:

Television Branch, Video Services Division,
Mass Media Bureau

WTTHDRA WAL OF JOINT REQUEST
FOR APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

GARRY A. SPIRE d/b/a HOKEIKO BROADCASTING COMPANY ("Hokeiko"), one
of the above-captioned applicants for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on
Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah, by its attorneys, hereby withdraws from the Commission the
December 14, 1995 Joint Request For Approval of Settlement Agreement in this case, effective
as of October 18, 1997. This ten-day prior notification is required under the Settlement
Agreement, but the Commission is being notified of the withdrawal immediately as described
below. In support whereof, it is shown as follows:
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KM Communications, inc., ("KM"), Hokeiko, and Channel 20 Television Company
("CTTC") are each applicants for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on
Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah. Front Range Broadcasting Company ("FRBC") is an
applicant for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on Channel 24 in Ogden,
Utah. On December 14, 12995, a Joint Request for Approval of Settlement Agreement was
tendered for filing with the Commission on behalf of KM, Hokeiko, CTTC land FRBC, in which
those parties requested Commission approval of certain Settlement Agreements annexed to that
Joint Request. The Settlement Agreements contemplated dismissal of the respective applications
of KM. Hokeiko and FRBC and the grant of CTTC's above-captioned application for Channel 20
<•

in Salt Lake City, Utah.
/

The aforementioned Joint Request For Approval of Settlement Agreement has now been
pending before the Commission for one and three-quarters years, and no action has as yet been
taken on the Joint Request by the Commission. Under the provisions of Paragraph 13 of the
December 14, 1995 Settlement Agreement by and among Hokeiko and CTTC, if the
Commission for any reason fails to approve the Settlement Agreement and fails to grant CTTC's
application for a construction permit for Channel 20 in Salt Lake City and to dismiss the
competing applications, all within 12 months after the date of submission to the Commission of
the December 14, 1995 Joint Request For Approval of Settlement Agreement (i.e., by
December 15, 1996); or, if approved by the Commission if such actions do not become Final
Orders (as defined in Paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement between Hokeiko and CTTC),
then either Hokeiko or CTTC may terminate the Settlement Agreement upon ten days' written
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tfl21S:S77.DC

2

notice 10 the other, following which Hokeiko is entitled to resume the prosecution of its abovecaptioned application.

Based on the provisions of Paragraph 13 of the Settlement Agreement between Hokeiko
and CTTC, Hokeiko has notified CTTC that, effective October 18, 1997, the Settlement
Agreement would be terminated. Such termination would be effective immediately to reflect
Hokeiko's present intentions but for the fact that the Sc^lcmtut Agreement provides a minimum
of 10 days' written notice from Hokeiko to CTTC That notice expires on October 18, 1997.

In light of all the foregoing, Hokeiko hereby withdraws completely from the Commission
/

its participation in the December 14, 1995 Joint Request For Approval of Settlement Agreement
and hereby withdraws that pleading in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,
GARRY A. SPIRE d/b/a
HOKEIKO BROADCASTING COMPANY

^^^h^cr^^^r
Irving Gas'tfreund

, '

Kaye, Scholer, Herman, Hays & Handler,. LLP
901 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1100
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 682-3526
Its Attorneys
October 8, 1997
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
L Mary Odder, a secretary in the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,
LLP, do hereby certify that, on this 8th day of October, 1997, a copy of die foregoing
Withdrawal of Joint Request For Approval of Settlement Agreement, was transmitted via handdelivery or via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the offices of the following:
Clay C. Pendarvis, Esq.
Chief, Television Branch
Video Services Division
Mass Media Bureau
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, NW, Room 702
Washington, D.C. 20554
Mary M. Fitzgerald, Esq.
Television Branch
Video Services Division
Mass Media Bureau
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, N.W., Room 702
Washington, D.C 20554
Ms. Salina Ayers
Broadcast Analyst
Video Services Division
Mass Media Bureau
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, NW, Room 702
Washington, D.C 20554
Bany D. Wood, Esq.
Wood & Brinton, Chartered
2300 M Street, NW, Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20554
Counsel for Channel Twenty Television Company
Alan C. Campbell, Esq.
Irwin, Campbell & Tannenwald, P.C
1320 18th Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20036
Counsel for KM Communications, Inc.

A^/^J^C/
Odder
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ADDENDUM C

Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C 20554

OCT 6 1997
1800E1-SA
KM Communications, Inc.
c/o Alan C. Campbell, Esq.
Irwin, Campbell & Tannenwald P.C.
Suite 200
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Channel 20 Television Company
c/o Barry Wood, Esq.
Wood & Brinton
Suite 900A
2300 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
Garry A. Spire d/b/a
Hokeiko Broadcasting Company
Lawrence H. Rogow d/b/a
Front Range Broadcasting
Company
c/o Irving, Gastfreund, Esq.
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman,
Hays & Handler
Suite 1100
901 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
Re:

KM Communications, Inc.
BPCT-950109KE
Channel 20 Television
Company
BPCT-950320KK
Garry A. Spire d/b/a
Hokeiko Broadcasting
BPCT-950321KG
Channel 20
Salt Lake City
Front Range Broadcasting
BPCT-950321KH
Channel 24
Ogden, Utah

Dear Counselors:

This refers to the December 14, 1995, joint request by the abovedescribed applicants for approval of a joint settlement agreement
to resolve a conflict among their applications in accordance with
Section 73.3525 of the Commission's Rules. KM Communications,
Inc. (KM), Channel 20 Television Company (CTC),x and Hokeiko
Broadcasting Company (Hokeiko) are competing applicants for a
construction permit for a new commercial television station on
Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah; and Front Range Broadcasting
Company (Front Range) is an applicant for Channel 24 in Ogden,
Utah. A petition to deny was filed against Hokeiko and Front
Range by KM Communications, Inc.2
The agreement resolves all issues raised by the mutually
exclusive applications. The agreement provides for the dismissal
of KM's application in exchange for the payment by CTC of
$350,000; and the dismissal of Hokeiko's and Front Range's
applications in exchange for the payment by CTC of $65,000 to
each.
This agreement has been reviewed and the Commission finds no
reason to believe that any party to the agreement filed its
application for the purpose of reaching or carrying out such an
agreement. The Commission further finds that/the agreement is in
compliance with the Commission's rules and policies and that its
approval would be in the public interest. See Public Notice, FCC
95-391, released September 15, 1995.
Accordingly, the Agreement IS APPROVED; the applications of KM
Communications, Inc. Hokeiko Broadcasting Company and Front Range
Broadcasting Company ARE DISMISSED; and the petitions to deny ARE

*CTC requested a temporary waiver of the one to a market
rule in order to divest its ownership interest in KOOG(TV),
Ogden, Utah (BAPLCT-960906IB). However, that request is moot
because the assignment application was granted November 6, 1996,
and the transaction consummated June 30, 1997.
2

We have fully considered the matters set forth in the
petition to deny and conclude that there are no substantial and
material questions of fact that would warrant any further
inquiry.

DISMISSED as moot. Further, having found the applicant qualified
and that grant of the application would serve the public
interest, convenience and necessity, the application of Channel
20 Television Company, IS GRANTED.
Sincerel

Clay C. Pendarvis
Chief, Television Branch
Video Services Division
Mass Media Bureau

/

ADDENDUM D

TELECOPY TRANSHIATAL
WOOD & BRINTON, Chartered
2300 M Street, N.W., Suite 900A
Washington, D-C. 20037
(202) 293-5333
Telecopier: (202) 293-2509
Date:
October 17, 1997
Time:
TO;
FROM:

2:22 pm_

Irv Gastfreund
Barry Wood
Total Pages:
1
(including this page)

MESSAGE:
I am sorry that I was not available when you called the other day, I
called you back as soon as I returned to the office, but maybe you did
not get the message•
I received your letter of the 8th on October 9. It says that it was
sent by facsimile and federal express, but we never received any fax of
the document• No matter.
/
In our view, the filing with the FCC is, notwithstanding the "effective date" notation, a breach of the settlement agreement- The agreement was still in effect on October 8, and is still in effect, as the
notice period is not up yet.
There are other breaches, too, that were committed while the agreement
was unquestionably effective, but there is no need to get into those in
this fax* The point of this fax is that we are willing to overlook the
breaches if Hokeiko will get back on board.
On the assumption that you and your client have subsequently come to
your senses, my client and I are willing to stand by our earlier offer
to pay your client the proceeds of the settlement early*, without waiting for finality- In fact, we will go so far as to pay not only MrSpire but also his colleague Mr. Rogow, despite his own breach of the
Channel 24 agreementIn short, I have a couple of checks for you. Please call so that we
can close this out, in connection with a withdrawal of the October 8
filing.

!

•"",l ' '" " I " 1 - '

[

mimtmrnt

,

{

,,

THIS FACSIMILE IS INTENOED CULT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL TO WHOM IT IS AD0RESSED AND CONTAINS INFORMATION THAT
IS PRIVILEGED, CONFIDENTIAL AMD O Q E K T FROM DISCLOSURE W © E R APPLICABLE LA*/. IF YOU, THE READER OF THIS
FACSIMILE, ARE HOT THE IHTENDE0 RECIPIENT, OR THE AUTHORIZED EMPLOYEE OR AGENT Of THE INTEK0E0
RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT ANT 01SSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION
IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED, YOU ARE TO MOTIFY US IltOIATELY BY TELEPHONE (CALL COLLECT). PLEASE MAIL THE
ORIGINAL MESSAGE TO US AT THE A80VE ADDRESS, VE U1LL REIMBURSE POSTAGE CHARGES.

^

ADDENDUM E

BEFORE THE

JFefceral (tauttmttrafumja (EmttmteHtim
WASHINGTON. D.C. 80854

In re Applications of

MM Docket No.

KM COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

File No. BPCT-950109KE

CHANNEL TWENTY TELEVISION COMPANY

File No. BPCT-950320KK

GARRY A. SPIRE d/b/a

HOKEIKO BROADCASTING COMPANY

FileNo.BPCT-950321KG

For Construction Permit For
A New UHF Television Station
On Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah

FRONT RANGE BROADCASTING COMPANY

FileNo.BPCT-950321KH

For Construction Permit For
A New UHF Television Station
On Channel 24 in Ogden, Utah
TO:

Television Branch, Video Services Division.
Mass Media Bureau

PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Irving Gastfreund, Esq.
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, LLP
901 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
November 12, 1997
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ii.
Summary

The Letter Ruling of the Video Service Division and the issuance of the Video Service
Division of its construction permit to CTTC for Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah, were
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, contrary to law and established practice, and wholly
improvident and improper. For the reasons set forth above, dismissal of Hokeiko's abovecaptioned application by the Video Services Division was improper; Hokeiko's application must
continue to be processed and should not have been dismissed. Moreover, for the reasons set
forth above, grant of Hokeiko's application pursuant to the Settlement Agreement was improper,
since there was no longer a universal settlement, in light of Hokeiko's withdrawal. Moreover,
grant by the Commission of CTTC's captioned application was improper in any event, and
arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion, in light of CTTC's manifest abuse of process in
its clear efforts to impede, obstruct and prevent Hokeiko from bringing advance facts to the
attention of the Commission, Plainly, CTTC lacks the requisite character qualifications to be and
remain a Commission permittee and licensee. In light of all the foregoing, the Mass Media
Bureau (Video Service Division) should expeditiously reconsider and vacate its Letter Ruling
and should expeditiously rescind its grant of the CTTC construction permit for Channel 20 in
Salt Lake City, Utah, the Mass Media Bureau should also expeditiously reinstate Hokeiko's
above-captioned application to pending status and thereupon continue to process Hokeiko's
application in the ordinary course.
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BEFORE THE

Xtbttul

(Enrnmrnttratimtfi (HammtBBion
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20554

In re Applications of

MM Docket No.

KM COMMUNICATIONS, INC

File No. BPCT-950109KE

CHANNEL TWENTY TELEVISION COMPANY

File No. BPCT-950320KK

GARRY A. SPIRE d/b/a
HOKEIKO BROADCASTING COMPANY

FileNo.BPCT-950321KG

For Construction Permit For
A New UHF Television Station
On Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah

FRONT RANGE BROADCASTING COMPANY

File No. BPCT-950321KH

For Construction Permit For
A New UHF Television Station
On Channel 24 in Ogden, Utah
TO:

Television Branch, Video Services Division,
Mass Media Bureau

PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION

GARRY A. SPIRE d/b/a HOKEIKO BROADCASTING COMPANY ("Hokeiko"), one
of the above-captioned applicants for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on
Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah, by its attorneys, pursuant to Section 405 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and pursuant to Section LI 06 of the Commission's
Rules, hereby submits its instant Petition For Reconsideration with respect to the letter ruling of
the Chief of the Television Branch of the Video Services Division of the Commission's Mass
Media Bureau, which bears the stamped date of "October 6, 1997" (FCC Ref No. 1800E10SA)
(hereinafter "Letter Ruling"); and with respect to the construction permit (FCC File No. BPCT-
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950320KK) puiportedly issued by the Commission to Channel Twenty Television Company,
L.L.C on October 6, 1997, to implement the Letter Ruling, For convenience, a copy of the
Letter Ruling is annexed hereto as Exhibit l.1 In support whereof, it is shown as follows:
On or about March 21, 1995, Hokeiko tendered for filing with the Commission its abovecaptioned application for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on Channel 20
in Salt Lake City, Utah. According to Commission records, on or about March 20, 1995,
Channel Twenty Television Company, L.L.C. (hereinafter "CTTC") filed a competing
application for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on Channel 20 in Salt
Lake City, Utah; the File Number of that application is captioned above. According to

Under Section 1.106(f) of the Commission's Rules, and under Section 405 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, a petition for reconsideration must be filed
with the Commission within 30 days following the date of public notice of such action, as
that date is defined in Section 1.4(b) of the Commission's Rules. Under Section 1.4(b)(4)
of the Commission's Rules, where, as here, the full text of an action document is not
"released" by the Commission by making the full text available to the press and the
public in the Commission's Office of Public Affairs and by having the "release date"
appearing on the face of the document, as specified in Section 1.4(b)(2) of the
Commission's Rules, the date of "public notice", within the meaning of Section 1.4(b) of
the Commission's Rules is deemed to occur on the date that a descriptive document
entitled "Public Notice" describing the action in question is released by the Commission.
In this case, the Letter Ruling was not "released" by the Commission by making the full
text available to the press and to the public in the Commission's Office of Public Affairs,
nor did any "release date" appear on the face of the Letter Ruling. However, by Public
Notice (FCC Report No. 44097) released October 15,1997, the Commission gave public
notice that, on "October 6, 1997", the Commission, by its Mass Media Bureau, had
granted the above-captioned application of Channel Twenty Television Company and had
dismissed the above-captioned competing applications (including Hokeiko's abovecaptioned application). Hence, under Sections 1.106(f) and 1.4(b)(4) of the
Commission's Rules, the date by which Hokeiko's instant Petition For Reconsideration is
required to be filed with the Commission if Friday, November 14, 1997 — i.e., the
thirtieth day following the date of the Commission's aforementioned Public Notice of
October 15, 1997. Accordingly, Hokeiko's submission of its instant Petition For
Reconsideration to the Commission on November 12, 1997 is timely under Section
1.106(f) of the Commission's Rules.
Doc # 1 2 1 5 3 8 8 9 . D C
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Commission records, on January 9, 1995, KM Communications, Inc. ("KM") tendered for filing
with the Commission its above-captioned application for a construction permit fora new UHF
television station on Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah. Thus, the respective applications of
Hokeiko, of CTTC and of KM for Channel 20 in Salt Lake City were mutually exclusive with
one another since the Commission could not grant one of the applications without automatically
denying the other two applications, since mutually destructive electrical interference would
necessarily result if multiple parties were authorized by the Commission to operate broadcast
stations simultaneously on Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah, and, accordingly, the abovecaptioned applications of Hokeiko, of CTTC, and of KM ere required to be resolved by the
Commission in a consolidated position before any of the applications could have been granted, in
the absence of any reversal settlement of the Salt Lake City, Channel 20 proceeding. See
Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
On December 14, 1995, Hokeiko and CTTC sought to resolve their above-captioned
competing applications by entering into a Settlement Agreement dated December 14, 1995. A
Settlement Agreement was entered into by CTTC and KM, as well. On December 14, 1995, a
Joint Request for Approval of Settlement Agreement was tendered for filing with the
Commission on behalf of KM, Hokeiko, CTTC and Front Range Broadcasting Company
("FRBC") (which was an applicant for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on
Channel 24 in Ogden, Utah), in which those parties requested Commission approval of certain
Settlement Agreements annexed to that Joint Request. The Settlement Agreements contemplated
dismissal of the respective applications of KM, Hokeiko and FRBC and the grant of CTTC's
above-captioned application for Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah.
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On the morning of October 8, 1997 - i.e., approximately 22 months following the date of
submission of the Joint Request to the Commission - undersigned counsel for Hokeiko spoke
with the Commission's staff and informed her (i.e., Ms. Salina Ayers) that Hokeiko would that
day be terminating its participation in the Settlement Agreement by sending notice under that
agreement to the affected parties and by filing with the Commission on behalf of Hokeiko its
Withdrawal of Joint Request For Approval of Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Notice of
Withdrawal"). Annexed hereto as Exhibit 2 is the Declaration of Irving Gastfreund, in which it
is established (at ^6) that, during the October 8, 1997 conversation, Ms. Ayers advised him that,
as of that date, the joint request was still under consideration and required additional work by the
Mass Media Bureau's Television Branch and that all action would require normal approval by
the Chief of the Television Branch. Id. at 3. In addition, the annexed Declaration establishes
that, on October 8, 1997, Hokeiko, by its counsel, sent notice to CTTC of termination of the
Settlement Agreement, effective upon ten days written notice pursuant to Paragraph 13 of the
Settlement Agreement. Id. at f7. Furthermore, on October 8,1997, Hokeiko filed with the
Commission its Notice of Withdrawal. In that pleading, Hokeiko advised the Commission that it
was terminating the Settlement Agreement with CTTC and would renew pursuit of its competing
application for Channel 20.
In addition, to assure that the staff of the Television Branch of the ?Video Services
Division of the Commission's Mass Media Bureau had a copy of Hokeiko's Notice of
Withdrawal, a copy of that notice was sent by Mr. Gastfreund, on behalf of Hokeiko, via
facsimile on October 8, 1997, to: (1) Clay C. Pendarvis, Esq., Chief of the Television Branch of
the Video Services Division of the Commission's Mass Media Bureau; (2) Mary M. Fitzgerald,
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Esq., Supervisory Attorney, Television Branch, Mass Media Bureau; and (3) Selina Ayers of the
staff of the Television Branch of the Video Services Division of the Mass Media Bureau. See
Exhibit 2, infra, ^JIO. Mr. Gastfreund also telephoned Ms. Fitzgerald to ensure receipt of his
facsimile transmittal. Id- He also telephoned Ms. Fitzgerald on October 9, 1997, to confirm
receipt of a different facsimile transmittal. Although receipt was confirmed, at no time during
his conversations with Ms. Ayers or Ms. Fitzgerald on October 8-9, 1997, was he informed that
the Commission's Television Branch in the Video Services Division of the Mass Media Bureau
had acted on the Joint Request or had granted CTTC's aforementioned application or had
dismissed Hokeiko's application. See Exhibit 1, infra, at % 10.
Several days after October 8, 1997, Hokeiko's undersigned counsel received by mail at
his office a copy of a Letter Ruling addressed to, inter alia. Hokeiko and others; that letter was
signed by Clay C. Pendarvis as Chief of the Television Branch of the Video Services Division of
the Commission's Mass Media Bureau; that Letter Ruling (FCC Ref. No. 1800E1-SA) bore a
date stamp of October 6, 1997. That Letter Ruling approved the Settlement Agreement;
dismissed Hokeiko's application and dismissed KM's competing application and granted the
above-captioned application of CTTC for a construction permit. The envelope in which the letter
ruling arrived in my office via the U.S. Postal Service mail bears a postage meter stamp dated
October 10, 1997. See Exhibit 2, \l1. Additionally, the Television Branch of the Mass Media
Bureau issued to CTTC a construction permit (Permit File No. BPCT-950320KK) bearing a date
of October 6, 1997, and an expiration date of October 6,1999. That construction permit
evidences the grant by the Commission of the CTTC application.
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Based upon information conveyed to Hokeiko's counsel by Ms. Ayers during their brief
meeting on October 8, 1997, and based on the fact that neither Ms. Ayers nor Ms. Fitzgerald
advised him on October 8 or 9, 1997, that the Commission had acted on the Joint Request and
had dismissed Hokeiko's application and had granted CTTC's application prior to or on October
8, 1997, and, indeed, given the indication to Mr. Gastfreund from Ms. Ayers on October 8, 1997,
that additional work remained for the Television Branch on the approval process for the
Settlement Agreement, Mr. Gastfreund clearly understood that the Commission's staff had not
taken any action to approve the Joint Request on or before October 8, 1997. See Exhibit 2 at
1f 12. Hence undersigned counsel was shocked and surprised to receive the aforementioned Letter
Ruling which bore the October 6, 1997, stamped date (which was not typewritten), which was
purportedly two days prior to the date (i.e., October 8,19979) on which Hokeiko's Notice of
Withdrawal was filed and upon which it was faxed to the Commission's staff. Exhibit 2, ^fl2.
This was particularly surprising because the Letter Ruling (dated October 6,1997) had, as its
designated FCC reference number, the number "1800E1-SA". Id. The "SA" of the number, in
the experience of Hokeiko's counsel with Commission, which began in 1973, are the initials of
the Commission's staff member assigned to draft the ruling and submit it to the Chief of the
Branch for approval — here, that staff FCC member was Selina Ayers, whose initials are "SA".
Hence, in the experience of Hokeiko's counsel, Ms. Ayers would be expected to know on
October 8, 1997, whether the Television Branch had taken action by that date on the Joint
Request or whether additional work on the matter was required. See Exhibit 2 at f 12. What Ms.
Ayers stated to Hokeiko's counsel on October 8, 1997, was that the latter proposition was true.
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In light of the foregoing and in light of the experience of Hokeiko's FCC counsel in
Commission procedure and practice, it was counsel's conclusion that the Letter Ruling bearing
the October 6, 1997 date stamp was actually issued by the Television Branch of the
Commission's Mass Media Bureau after October 8,1 997, and not on October 6, 1997,
presumably through inadvertence. See Exhibit 2 at f 13.
Furthermore, the attention of the Commission is respectfully invited to the provisions of
Section LI 03 of the Commission's Rules. Under Section 1.103(a) of the Rules, unless otherwise
specified by law or by Commission Rule, the effective date of any Commission action is the date
of "public notice" of such action, as the latter date is defined in Section 1.4(b) of the
Commission's Rules. As noted in footnote 1, above, the date of such "public notice" in this case
was October 15, 1997. Hence, the filing by Hokeiko with the Commission on October 8, 1997 of
Hokeiko's Notice of Withdrawal occurred a full week prior to the October 15, 1997 effective
date of the Letter Ruling. This was clearly more than sufficient time for the Commission and its
staff to be on notice as to the fact that Hokeiko had taken action to effectuate its withdrawal from
the Settlement Agreement
In light of all the foregoing, it is clear that the Commission's Letter Ruling was
improvidently issued, in that it improperly and improvidently dismissed Hokeiko's abovecaptioned application and improvidently and improperly granted CTTC's above-captioned
application. The Commission clearly should have continued to maintain the viability of
Hokeiko's application and should have continued to process it. Consequently, the grant by the
Commission of CTTC's application, in light of the pendency of Hokeiko's application, was
improper, under Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
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In addition, the grant of CTTC's above-captioned application, as established by the Letter
Ruling and upon aforementioned Commission construction permit evidencing the grant of
CTTC's application, were improper and improvidently issued, in that CTTC lacks the requisite
character qualifications to be a Commission permittee or licensee.
In this regard, it should be noted that CTTC has instituted a lawsuit against Hokeiko in
the Third Judicial Court of Salt Lake County in the State of Utah. Channel Twenty Television
Company, L.L.C. v. Garry A. Spire d/b/a Hokeiko Broadcasting Company. Civil Action No.
970907787CN (Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, November 1997). Annexed
hereto as Exhibit 3 is a photocopy of CTTC's complaint in that proceeding. As will be noted
therein, CTTC is seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction and a
permanent injunction designed to prevent Hokeiko from filing its instant Petition For
Reconsideration with the Commission and designed specifically to prevent impede and obstruct
Hokeiko from bringing to the Commission's attention the facts which Hokeiko presently seeks to
bring to the Commission's attention.
These facts raise substantial and material questions of fact as to whether CTTC possesses
the requisite character qualifications to be and remain a Commission permittee and, significantly,
a licensee. It is a basic tenet of broadcast communications law that construction permits may be
awarded only to applicants who are fully qualified. See Kannapolis Television Co.. A Joint
Venture. 1 FCC Red 1037, 1039 (1986); Professional Radio. Inc..

FCC Red

, FCC 86-

362 (released August 18, 1986). Thus, in Kannapolis Television Co.. A Joint Venture, the full
Commission firmly rejected a settlement agreement which contemplated the grant of an
applicant's application where the applicant was found unqualified on character grounds to be a
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licensee. The Commission has also held that, where a party files pleadings or takes other
obstructive actions intended to delay or harass its opponents, such actions undermine the
Commission's processes and adversely reflect on the party's character to be a Commission
licensee. See Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing. 102 FCC 2d
1179, 1211 (1986); see also, Viacom International. Inc.. 2 FCC Red 3259, 3260 (1987); Radio
Carrollton. 69 FCC 2d 1139, 1150-51 (1978), clarified. 69 FCC 2d 424 (1978), a£Pd sub nom..
Faulkner Radio. Inc v. FCC.

F.2d

, No. 79-1749 (D.C. Or. October 15, 1980), cert.

denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). Furthermore, the Review Board has held that it would be
improper for an applicant to deliberately withhold from the Commission information pertinent to
another applicant's qualifications to be a licensee, since such conduct constitutes an abuse of the
Commission's processes. Home Service Broadcasting Corp.. 24 FCC 2d 192, 196 (Rev. Bd.
1970).
As shown above, in this case, CTTC has gone so far as to file a complaint with the state
courts in Utah seeking not only monetary damages against Hokeiko for alleging breach of the
Settlement Agreement (contention which is denied by Hokeiko), but, in addition, CTTC's
Complaint has requested the state court judge in the State of Utah to issue a temporary
restraining order (and such other injunctive relief as may be appropriate) to specifically prevent
Hokeiko from bringing to the Commission's attention facts which would bear on the propriety of
the Letter Ruling in this case and on the propriety of granting a construction permit to CTTC.2

2

However, the Commission's attention is respectfully invited to the fact that, subsequently, on this date, the Trial Court Judge in the State of Utah denied CTTC's request
for a temporary restraining order, and, based on such conduct, Hokeiko was enabled to
file its instant Petition For Reconsideration with the Commission on this date, once
counsel for Hokeiko learned of the Judge's refusal to issue a temporary restraining order.
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Clearly, CTTC must have been aware, through its communications counsel, that the deadline for
the filing of the instant Petition For Reconsideration was by the close of business on Friday,
November 14, 1997, and that, under Section 1.106 of the Commission's Rules and Section 405
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, any failure by Hokeiko, for whatever reason,
to file its instant Petition For Reconsideration with the Commission by the close of business on
Friday, November 14, 1997, would have to be regarded by the Commission as fatal delay in
timeliness of filing, thereby justifying dismissal of any such filing at a later time. A prompt
filing by Hokeiko was thus jurisdictional. Here, CTTC's specific conduct to seek a restraining
order and to seek injunctive relief designed specifically to prevent Hokeiko from bringing facts
to the attention of the Commission constitute an abuse of process which is far more serious than
mere threats. Even threats are inappropriate and contrary to Commission policy in Letter from
Timothy D. Hutchinson to John W. Connor (October 18, 1991), attaching Letter from Alan Y.,
Naftalin to Timothy D. Hutchinson (October 18, 1991). The Commission itself has recognized
that abuse of process occurs even when an improper threat is made to invoke the Commission's
process unless another party accedes to some demands. See, e.g.. Gulf Coast Communications.
Inc., 81 FCC 2d 499, 513 (Rev. Bd. 1981), recon. denied, 88 FCC 2d 1033 (Rev. Bd. 1981),
review denied. FCC 82-168 (April 16, 1982). In short, CTTC has used improper means in an
effort to literally prevent Hokeiko from bringing facts and arguments to the Commission's
attention which might be adverse to CTTC and to its ability to become and remain the permittee
(and, presumably, the licensee) of a new UHF television station on Channel 20 in Salt Lake City,
Utah. Clearly, the Commission should not sanction such conduct, which constitutes manifest
abuse of the Commission's processes by CTTC,
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In light of all the foregoing, it is clear that CTTC lacks the character qualifications to be
and to remain a Commission permittee or licensee. Accordingly, even if it were to be assumed,
arguendo, that the dismissal of Hokeiko's above-captioned application were proper (an
assumption which has been borne herein to be completely unwarranted), nonetheless, in light of
the facts described above, the grant of CTTC's application by the Commission was arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion and wholly improper, based upon the clear lack of character
fitness by CTTC to hold the Commission authorization for Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah.
It should be noted that CTTC's Complaint in the state court action in Utah was apparently
filed with the Third Judicial Court of Salt Lake County on November 3, 1997. See, Exhibit 2
hereto. Moreover, on November 5, 1997, CTTC filed with that court its Motion For Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction; in addition, on November 7, 1997, CTTC filed
with the Utah court its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of its Motion For
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. For the convenience of the
Commission, copies of CTTC's Motion of November 5, 1997 and of the CTTC Memorandum of
Points and Authorities of November 7, 1997, are annexed hereto as Exhibits 3 and 4,
respectively. It should also be noted that CTTC's Motion For Temporary Restraining Order was
denied on November 12, 1997, by Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki.
In short, the facts pertaining to the filing by CTTC of its request for a restraining order
and injunctive relief to prevent Hokeiko from bringing facts to the Commission's attention —
facts upon which Hokeiko is now relying — clearly relate to events which have occurred or
circumstances which have changed since the last opportunity to present such matters (i.e., prior
to the date of the Letter Ruling and prior to the date of the October 6, 1997 issuance of a
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construction permit to CTTC. As shown above, the filing of the state court litigation by CTTC
has just occurred, and it took place several weeks following the date of the Letter Ruling and the
date of the aforementioned construction permit. Consequently, these facts are cognizable by the
Commission, pursuant to Section 1.106(c)(1) of the Commission's Rules, since these facts fall
within the category set forth in Section L106(b)(2)(i) of the Commission's Rules.
III. Conclusion
In light of all the foregoing, the Letter Ruling of the Video Service Division and the
issuance of the Video Service Division of its construction permit to CTTC for Channel 20 in Salt
Lake City, Utah, were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, contrary to law and
established practice, and wholly improvident and improper. For the reasons set forth above,
dismissal of Hokeiko's above-captioned application by the Video Services Division was
improper; Hokeiko's application must continue to be processed and should not have been
dismissed. Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, grant of Hokeiko's application pursuant to
the Settlement Agreement was improper, since there was no longer a universal settlement, in
light of Hokeiko's withdrawal. Moreover, grant by the Commission of CTTC's captioned
application was improper in any event, and arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion, in
light of CTTC's manifest abuse of process in its clear efforts to impede, obstruct and prevent
Hokeiko from bringing advance facts to the attention of the Commission, Plainly, CTTC lacks
the requisite character qualifications to be and remain a Commission permittee and licensee. In
light of all the foregoing, the Mass Media Bureau (Video Service Division) should expeditiously
reconsider and vacate its Letter Ruling and should expeditiously rescind its grant of the CTTC
construction permit for Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah, the Mass Media Bureau should also
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expeditiously reinstate Hokeiko's above-captioned application to pending status and thereupon
continue to process Hokeiko's application in the ordinary course.

Respectfully submitted,
GARRY A. SPIRE d/b/a
HOKEIKO BROADCASTING COMPANY

Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,. LLP
901 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1100
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 682-3526
Its Attorneys
November 12, 1997
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OCTOBER 12, 1999
HONORABLE HOMER WILKINSON PRESIDING
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT - RULING ONLY
THE COURT: Counsel, I've had the opportunity, of
course, to read over your memorandums and I can assure you
that I've read over and over these paragraphs which you've
been referring to here.

And I fully understand that the

Court does not have the right to rewrite the contract of
the parties and that's what I hope I'm not doing here,
although probably part of you are going to feel like maybe
I am doing that.

The Court does try to look at this as to

what is reasonable and what make sense as far as all the
wordings of the paragraphs, all the wording in the
paragraphs concerned give some meaning to it.
Now, I asked counsel a question that you can't
have something to fail to approve unless you have something
to approve.

And this starts out in kind of a backward or a

negative sense, to say you fail to approve, the only way
you fail to approve something is you must have something to
approve.

And if you have to fail to approve it within 12

months, then it follows that you must approve it within 12
months.
Now, I broke down this paragraph in this way, I
say that (A) if the commissioner or his delegates for any
reason, one, fails to approve this settlement agreement, to
1

grant the application and to dismiss the competing
applications within 12 months after submission to joint
petitioner requested such approval, or, two, if approved,
such actions do not become final orders, then (B) either
party may terminate this settlement agreement upon ten day
written notice to the applicant.
Now, that still leaves a question in mind, it
does in my mind, but it could leave a question as to where
does the 12 months apply.

Now, if I read that again, read

it this way, and, of course, you can put it two different
ways; (A) the commission or his delegates for any reason,
one, fail to approve this settlement agreement to grant the
application and dismiss competing applications within 12
months of the submission of the joint petition who
requested such approval, or, two, if approved within 12
months after submission such actions do not become final
orders and (B) then either party may object. Now, I think
that gives full meaning to all of the paragraphs.
Now, counsel for the plaintiff has raised the
issue in that it doesn't give full meaning because it could
not become final-- at least 45 days elapsed.

Apparently

that's the argument or that's the rules of the commission,
I assume.
I asked counsel for the defendants where does the
12 months apply, to the approval or to the becoming final
2

orders?

He says becoming final orders.

Of course, I

reread that and rewrote it and, number two, if approved,
such actions do not become final orders within 12 months
after submission, then (B) either party may terminate this
settlement agreement.
Now, that is the interpretation of this Court.

I

think it is the most reasonable to be placed upon this.
However, the Court is even of the opinion that if it does
not become final within the 12 month period, that the
application must be approved within the 12 month period.
So either way the Court interprets the paragraph 13 as the
application must either be denied or approved within 12
months and/or -- and, of course, based on that I would have
to find in favor of the defendant.
But then I go on, and/or the question is then
must become final order within 12 months.

I'm of the

opinion that's where it implies also, although I don't
think I need to find that to rule on this issue because I
do still think that they could still have objected to the
application and, of course, terminate it within the ten day
period.
Now, based on that, I have to find in favor of
the defendant and against the plaintiff.

Now, I'm also of

the opinion that paragraph called 13--no, paragraph 3,
paragraph 3, the conditions met in paragraph 3 have not
3

been met.

They are conditions precedent as far as the

application becoming final and the agreement all being
adhered to, although I do agree with the plaintiffs that I
do think that the benefit of the conditions precedent, most
of them run to the benefit of the plaintiff.

And if it was

just on that alone then I may be looking at making a
different decision.
I don't think the question of the impeding, or
paragraph 4 comes into play under my ruling.

I don't think

the question of estoppel comes into play under my ruling.
I would ask the defendants to prepare an order
and the necessary findings of facts to support my position.
Any questions?
MR. ARRINGTON: Thank you.
THE COURT: If there are no questions the Court
will be in recess.
MR. RAMPTON: I'm sorry, your Honor.

You

indicate, I'd like a little clarification on whether the
ruling, you say that the breach, the prior breach does not
come into play in your ruling.

Is the Court ruling that

there are no prior breaches?
THE COURT: Oh, yes, I think there have been prior
breaches.

But to rule the way, to reach my ruling, I did

not have to get into paragraph 3 as far as the breaches are
concerned.

Yes, I think they have been breached although I
4

1

am of the opinion that most of them are under the benefit

2

of the plaintiff and if I looked close to it, maybe some of

3

those might have been breached because they are to the

4

benefit of the plaintiff and he can set them aside, if you

5

understand what I'm saying.

6
7

MR. RAMPTON: Is that saying there wasn't any
evidence that there was impeding though?

8

THE COURT: Oh, on the impediment?

I'm saying

9

that, in the impediment I didn't even get into that.

10

don't think there's sufficient evidence here in the

11

contract for impediment under paragraph 4

12 J
13
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